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The defence of open society has been the main mission of the Central European University 
(CEU) since its creation in 1991. This article explores the history of the CEU, from the 
crucial years of the immediate post-Cold War until the present day. It is divided into two 
parts: the first part analyses the origins of the CEU, its aims and the concept of the open 
society as an academic mission; the second part focuses on the clash between the CEU and 
the Hungarian government, led by right-wing populist minister Viktor Orbán. The “CEU 
affair” has opened a debate about the nature of the relationship between academic freedom, 
open society and the rule of law in Hungary and in Europe. Reconstructing the history of 
the CEU offers the chance to explore the evolution of the open society ideal in Central and 
Eastern Europe, from the euphoria of the post-Cold War to the challenges of the 21st 
century. 
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The sociologist Ralph Dahrendorf, in the collection of essays La società 
riaperta, reminds us that open societies are those that allow trial and error, change 
and evolution, namely complexity1. An open society is a pluralist society that 
promotes and protects freedom of expression and human rights and allows the best 
expression of citizenship. It is a society in which everyone – regardless of race, 
nationality, gender or sexual orientation – can enjoy the benefits of freedom2.  
According to Dahrendorf, closed societies restrict mobility while open societies 
demand it. An open society promotes natural change; it is a mobile society in the 
broader sense of the word, embracing social, geographic and economic factors 
(social increase and decrease, geographic movements and migratory phenomena, 
and mobility of economic factors of production)3. Open society offers multiple 
choices, suggests open horizons and allows change and modernity. In the words of 
Dahrendorf, «the road to freedom is not a road from one system to another, but one 
that leads into the open space of infinite possible futures, some of which compete 
with each other. Their competition makes history»4. 
An open society benefits from a variety of options: different types of media as 
well as plural political parties, opportunities for access and a full range of human 
rights5. Consequentially, the greatest threat to open society is dogma: the monopoly 
of one group, one ideology and one system. This involves, for instance, the intrusion 
of the State, a political party, a ruling class or a religion into the free expression of 
citizenship, the definition of social space or academic freedom6. 
Defending open society and with it aspiring to the formation of “free minds, in 
a free society”, has been vital to the mission of the CEU (Central European 
University) since it was established in 19917. The CEU is an English-language 
university, founded by American-Hungarian philanthropist George Soros, student 
of Karl Popper at the LSE (London School of Economics and Political Science) and 
an active supporter of the values of the open society, and by a group of visionary 
intellectuals – most of whom were prominent members of the anti-totalitarian 
democratic opposition (among them Ernest Gellner and Alfred Stepan)8. The 
overall idea of the CEU was to establish a higher education institution whose 
                                                 
1 R. Dahrendorf, La società riaperta. Dal crollo del muro alla guerra in Iraq, Laterza, 2005 [or. ed.: 
Der Wiederbeginn der Geschichte. Vom Fall der Mauer zum Krieg im Irak, Verlag C.H. Beck, 
2004]. 
2 M. Ignatieff, Introduction, in M. Ignatieff, S. Roch (Eds.), Rethinking Open Society. New 
Adversaries and New Opportunities, CEU Press, 2018, 8. 
3 C. Cerami, The Open Society and “British Soft Power” in Central/Eastern Europe at the End of 
the Cold War, in Journal of European Integration History, No. 1, 2010, 69; R. Dahrendorf, La 
società riaperta, cit., 22-35. 
4 R. Dahrendorf, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe, Times Book, 1990, 41 
5 R. Dahrendorf, After 1989. Morals, Revolution and Civil Society, MacMillan Press, 1997, 16. 
6 R. Dahrendorf, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe, cit., 28. 
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priorities were to foster research into the transition of post-communist societies to 
market economy and political liberalisation, to encourage an intense exchange of 
scholars and students between Eastern and Western Europe, and lastly to contribute 
to the long-term goal of creating an open society in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Since then, the CEU has consolidated its reputation as an international university, 
attracting talented students and graduates from all over Europe and the world. The 
CEU has become a significant think-tank in the very heart of Central Eastern 
Europe9. 
Yet, despite indisputable academic merits, the CEU accredited in the United 
States and Hungary, based in Budapest, has been heavily attacked by the current 
Hungarian government, led by right-wing populist Prime Minister Victor Orbán. 
The legal battle culminated in 2017 with the entry into force in Hungary of the so-
called “Lex CEU”, which made it impossible for the CEU to continue operating in 
the country. Starting from September 2019, the CEU was forced to relocate a large 
part of its activities to Vienna, outside Hungary. The core of the attack was the 
assertion that the CEU acts for political purposes. As rector and historian Michael 
Ignatieff wrote: «The claim is false, as the accrediting agencies who inspect our 
teaching or review our research have attested, but the attacks are inevitable, in a 
sense, since the university’s mission – to promote the values of a free society – is 
bound to create suspicion and criticism when governments encroach upon those 
values»10. Taking up Ignatieff’s words, the “CEU affair” constitutes a dark moment 
for academic freedom in Hungary and, more generally, in Europe11. 
In October 2020, the European Court of Justice ruled against the “Lex CEU”. In 
a judgment of 6 October 2020, the European Court of Justice agreed with the 
European Commission that Hungary breached WTO law, EU law and the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union «relating to academic freedom, the 
freedom to found higher education institutions and the freedom to conduct a 
business»12. The victory, however, came too late for the institution as it had already 
moved to Vienna13.   
The “CEU affair” has opened a debate about the nature of the relationship 
between academic freedom, open society and the rule of law in Hungary and in 
Europe. As Jacques Rupnik recalls «countries that were considered as ‘success 
stories’ in the transition and consolidation of liberal democracy (Hungary and 
Poland) now challenge the institutions of the rule of law. Instead of building a ‘state 
                                                 
9 C. Cerami, In difesa della “società aperta”: la Central European University (CEU), in Mente 
Politica, 28 August 2019, mentepolitica.it/articolo/in-difesa-della-a-oesociet-apertaa-la-central-
european-university-ceu/1668.  
10 M. Ignatieff, Introduction, in M. Ignatieff, S. Roch (Eds.), Rethinking Open Society, cit., 2. 
11 S. Walker, “Dark Day for Freedom”: Soros-affiliated university quits Hungary. Central 
European University is first major university to be pushed out of an EU country, in The Guardian, 
3 December 2018. 
12 Commission v Hungary (Higher education) (C-66/18), 6 October 2020, 
curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2020-10/cp200125en.pdf. 
13 Central European University (CEU) is now accredited in Austria, Hungary, and the United States, 
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of law’ (Rechtsstaat), Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is now calling for an 
‘illiberal state’»14. This “counter-revolution”15 is driven by the polarisation of 
domestic politics, the questioning of constitutionalism and the rule of law, the attack 
on the independence of the media and academic freedom, the politicisation of the 
administration. It is the return to closed borders, the sovereign state and 
transactional power politics: the result is the rejection of open society.  
This article explores the history of the CEU, its founding mission and its 
achievements, from its foundation in 1991 up to the present day. It is divided into 
two parts: the first part analyses the origins of the CEU in the crucial years of the 
immediate post-Cold War, its aims and the concept of an open society as an 
academic mission; the second part focuses on the analysis of the clash between the 
CEU and the Hungarian government and the attack on academic freedom, 
democratic institutions and the idea of a free and pluralist society. The history of 
the CEU allows us to investigate the complex relationship between academic 
freedom, open society and the rule of law. This article offers a contribution to the 
debate focusing on the idea of open society and its values and on the importance of 
building a narrative on the defence of these values in 21st century Europe. 
 
2. The End of the Cold War and the Open Society Ideal: The Origins of the 
Central European University 
 
The concept of the open society was first introduced by Henri Bergson in 1932 
when he published his book Two Sources of Religion and Morality. The concept 
gained visibility after the Second World War when Karl Popper wrote his book The 
Open Society and its Enemies, published in 194516.  
Historian Michael Ignatieff, in the introduction to the collective volume 
Rethinking Open Society. New Adversaries and New Opportunities, reminds us that 
it is through the writings and commitment of some thinkers such as Karl Popper, 
Hannah Arendt17, Raymond Aron18, Friedrich von Hayek19, George Orwell20 and 
Isaiah Berlin21 that the concept of open society was defined, starting from the 
Second World War22. The open society is the product of that unique post-war 
moment when, after 1945, the challenges that liberal democracy would have to face 
against fascism and communism emerged. The concept gained visibility mainly 
                                                 
14 J. Rupnik, After 1989: The Perennial Return of Central Europe Reflections on the Sources of the 
Illiberal Drift in Central Europe in M. Ignatieff, S. Roch (Eds.), Rethinking Open Society, cit., 258.  
15 J. Zielonka, Counter-Revolution. Liberal Europe in retreat, Oxford University Press, 2018. 
16 K. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Routledge Classics (new edition), 2002, [or. ed.: 
K. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Routledge, 1945]. 
17 H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarism, Schocken, 1951. 
18 R. Aron, Opium of Intellectuals, Calmann-Lévy, 1955. 
19 F. von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, London, 1944. 
20 G. Orwell, Animal Farm: A Fairy Story, Secker and Warburg, 1945; G. Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-
Four (1984), Secker & Warburg, 1949. 
21 I. Berlin, Liberty, Oxford University Press, 2002. 
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thanks to Karl Popper. Popper wrote his authoritative book The Open Society and 
Its Enemies during the Second World War while he was in exile in New Zealand. 
At the time, he considered it his “war work”, that is his contribution to the war 
effort. The book attracted immediate attention after its publication in 194523. 
Popper, from his Chair in Logic and the Scientific Method at the London School of 
Economics, which he held from 1949 onwards, became the point of reference for a 
whole generation of scholars inspired by his view of the open society (among these 
were Ralf Dahrendorf, Ernest Gellner and George Soros). To Popper, education is 
a key part of the open society and in his view, all teaching on the university level 
should be training and encouragement in critical thinking.  
The real triumph of Popper’s book came later. In the enthusiasm generated by 
the 1989 revolution, The Open Society and Its Enemies became essential reading 
throughout the post-communist world24. After the fall of Communism in Central 
and Eastern European countries and the end of the Cold War, European prospects 
seemed promising. There arose a great need to build free and democratic 
institutions, and to reintroduce notions of freedom of thought and critical thinking 
in post-communist Europe. 
In this regard, the historian Vladimir Tismaneanu recalls: 
 
The upheaval in Eastern Europe represented a series of political revolutions that 
led to the decisive and irreversible transformation of the existing order. Instead of 
autocratic, one-party systems, the revolutions created emerging pluralist policies. 
They allowed the citizens of the former ideologically driven despotisms (closed 
societies) to recover their main human and civil rights and to engage in the building 
of open societies. Instead of centrally planned command economies, all these 
societies embarked on creating market economies. In their efforts to meet the triple 
challenge (creating political pluralism, market economy, and a public sphere, i.e., 
civil society) some succeeded better and faster than others25. 
 
In his essay Reflection on the Revolution in Europe, written in 1990, Ralf 
Dahrendorf tried to define the meaning of 1989 and the stakes of the transitions that 
were then beginning in the Eastern part of the continent. For Dahrendorf «the 
revolution of 1989 has changed Europe. It has changed the world; it marks a turning 
point as important as 1789 […]. It was a change for the better because it was one 
for open societies»26. As Jacques Rupnik points out, «for Dahrendorf, as for the 
sociologist Ernest Gellner, this was the deep meaning of 1989, which presented an 
opportunity for liberal democracy in Central and Eastern Europe»27. 
                                                 
23 R. Dahrendorf, La società riaperta, cit., 22. 
24 Ibidem. 
25 V. Tismaneanu, The Revolutions of 1989: Causes, Meanings, Consequences, in Contemporary 
European History, No. 3, 2009, 277. 
26 R. Dahrendorf, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe, cit., 178. 
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The changes produced by the events of 1989 were both very rapid and radical. 
In the end, they led to the delegitimization of an entire ruling class, the replacement 
of almost all its exponents and a constitutional transformation with far-reaching 
consequences.  
During the 1980s and early 1990s, Western liberalism and anti-communist 
dissent found a common understanding in defence of the open society. Dissidents 
in Warsaw, Prague and Budapest launched a challenge to their communist regimes, 
using the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 to create non-governmental organisations for 
the defence of human rights, freedom of expression and the press, for the 
dismantling of the communist system and the creation of a pluralist society28. 
Academics, journalists and philanthropists from other countries offered support, 
including George Soros, who used the concept of open society to provide his 
philanthropic support for the dissidents29.  
Popper’s ideas inspired Soros to encourage critical thinking in education as a 
precondition for the creation of an active civil society. Soros described the 
importance of Popper’s influence on his view of open society: 
 
As a student after World War II, I adopted Popper’s concept of Open Society with 
alacrity […]. Popper’s dichotomy between open and closed societies seemed to me 
profoundly important. Not only did it illuminate the fundamental flaw in totalitarian 
ideologies but it also threw light on some basic philosophical issues. It is his 
philosophy that guided me in establishing my network of Open Society 
Foundations30. 
 
Similar to Popper, Soros sought a key role for higher education in the 
transformation of the newly independent East Central European societies31. In a 
concept note that was circulated in April 1990, George Soros called for an 
educational initiative for Eastern Europe. He argued that: 
 
The mere fact that a closed system has collapsed does not lead to the 
establishment of an open society […]. The creation of a free and open system of 
social organization will require a tremendous effort, particularly in education. The 
countries of the region […] must get to know better each other’s cultures and they 
must digest the experiences of the last half-century. These tasks require greater 
cooperation among the existing universities of the region as well as the establishment 
of a new institution32. 
                                                 
28 M. Ignatieff, Introduction, in M. Ignatieff, S. Roch (Eds.), Rethinking Open Society, cit., 8. 
29 Ibidem. 
30 C. Cerami, The Open Society and “British Soft Power” in Central/Eastern Europe at the End of 
the Cold War, cit., 74; G. Soros, Open Society. Reforming Global Capitalism, Little Brown, 2000, 
xxi-xxii. 
31 S. Roch, Educating Skeptical but Passionate Citizens: The Open Society Ideal as a University 
Mission, in M. Ignatieff, S. Roch (Eds.), Rethinking Open Society, cit., 52. 
32 G. Soros, An Educational Initiative for Eastern Europe (Open Society Archives, Budapest, 2 April 
1990), taken from S. Roch, Educating Skeptical but Passionate Citizens: The Open Society Ideal as 
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The CEU was founded in 1991 as a graduate school in social sciences and 
humanities, with the express purpose of encouraging, through education, the 
democratic transition process in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 
CEU’s mission as a university is to sustain the values of open society – freedom, 
justice, tolerance, democracy and respect for knowledge33. The CEU, initially based 
in Prague, Warsaw and Budapest, consolidated a unified single campus in 
Budapest34. George Soros was among the prominent founders and sponsors of the 
CEU and the first Chairman of the CEU Board. Alfred C. Stepan was the first 
Rector of the CEU in 1993; he was an American political scientist specialising in 
comparative politics. In 1994, the famous social anthropologist Ernest Gellner 
became the Director of the Center for the Study of Nationalism at the CEU in Prague 
and launched an innovative programme of studies on nationalism35.  
The Gellner Collection at the LSE Archive in London allows researchers to 
reconstruct the correspondence between Gellner, Soros and Stepan in the early 
1990s36. This exchange focused on the activities and evolution of the CEU. It 
reveals the important role of this group of scholars and thinkers in the struggle 
against totalitarianism and the opening up of closed societies37. 
On 30 October 1995, in a letter to George Soros, Gellner wrote: 
 
We are studying Nationalism because it constitutes one of the major threats to the 
emergence of stable, liberal and prosperous societies in Eastern Europe. But another 
and equally important threat is the moral and intellectual vacuum left behind by the 
collapse of communism (which after all wasn’t displaced by a rival, but simply 
collapsed, leaving a vacuum). The enquiry into philosophical and political issues at 
the Centre would really be guided by this consideration38. 
  
                                                 
33 M. Ignatieff, Open Society and the Ordinary Virtues, Rethinking Open Society, 18 September 
2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7-5zT7_NvDY.  
34 In the first years of its existence, the CEU operated in three locations: some departments 
(Economics, European Studies, International Relations, Nationalism Studies, History of Art) were 
in the Prague office, directed by Jiri Musil. Other Departments (History, Medieval History, Political 
Sciences, Environmental Sciences, Legal Studies and Gender Studies) were located in Budapest, 
under the direction of the historian Istvan Rev. The sociology programme developed in Warsaw. 
See: G. Soros, In Defense of Open Society, Public Affairs, 2019, 99. 
35 E. Gellner, Condition of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals, Hamish Hamilton Ltd., 1994.  
36 Gellner’s correspondence for those years can be consulted in the Gellner Collection, which is held 
at the LSE Archive in London. 
37 C. Cerami, The Open Society and “British Soft Power” in Central/Eastern Europe at the End of 
the Cold War, cit., 74.  
38 Gellner to Soros, 30 October 1995, in LSE Archives, Gellner Collection, Box 54, Folder M 1913, 
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It is therefore evident that in those years the open society ideal played a crucial 
role by inspiring initiatives in favour of freedom of expression, the rule of law and 
the revival of civil society in Central and Eastern Europe39. 
The CEU is the result of that particular historical moment; its aim is to support 
the Central Eastern European countries, in cultural, academic and educational 
terms, in their complex transition towards the ideals of an open society. The origin 
of the CEU is therefore part of a specific and decisive moment in European history. 
In those years, a crucial factor that contributed to democratic consolidation in 
Central Europe was the accession process to the European Union and the adoption 
of the so-called “Copenhagen criteria”. These criteria adopted by the European 
Council at Copenhagen in 1993, stipulated that candidate countries had to prove 
their liberal democratic credentials before being admitted, in other words 
«demanded the introduction of a constitution of liberty in candidate countries»40. 
The methods of evaluating the Copenhagen criteria led to the fact that the condition 
for joining the EU was, and still is, the possession of a democratic system and 
respect for human rights. Candidates also had to demonstrate that they could operate 
within the union’s common market, and reliably apply EU law41. The EU put great 
emphasis on the capacity of new member states to implement the EU legislation 
known as the “acquis communautaire”42. This process of “Europeanization”, 
motivated by the desire of Central and Eastern European countries to be part of 
“Europe”, helped stabilize democracy in post-communist countries43 and has 
provided a major leverage to the development of institutions and practices of the 
rule of law44.  
Karl Popper himself visited the CEU at the Prague campus on 26 May 1994 and 
was awarded the first CEU Open Society Prize. Popper died only a few months 
later, on 17 September 1994. In the year following Popper’s death, Gellner launched 
the idea of a conference to be held at the CEU to celebrate the 50th anniversary of 
the publication of The Open Society and Its Enemies45. Gellner’s main objective in 
organising the conference was to highlight the role played by Popper’s book, The 
Open Society, in inspiring initiatives, projects and the very idea of the CEU in the 
name of the open society. Gellner also intended to launch a debate on how an open 
                                                 
39 C. Cerami, The Open Society and “British Soft Power” in Central/Eastern Europe at the End of 
Cold War, cit., 78. 
40 R. Dahrendorf, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe, cit., viii. 
41 J.W. Mueller, Eastern Europe Goes South. Disappearing Democracy in the EU’s Newest 
Members, in Foreign Affairs, No. 2, 2014, 14. 
42 J. Rupnik, From the Revolutions of 1989 to Democracy Fatigue in Eastern Europe, in J. Rupnik 
(Ed.), 1989 as a Political Event. Democracy, Europe and the New International System in the Age 
of Globalization, Routledge, 2014, 67. 
43 R. Dahrendorf, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe, cit., viii. 
44 J. Rupnik, From the Revolutions of 1989 to Democracy Fatigue in Eastern Europe, cit., 67-68.  
45The conference was held on 9 and 10 November 1995. Revised and reconsidered texts prepared in 
the light of the conference’s discussions were published in I. Jarvie, S. Pralong (Eds.), Popper’s 
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society can be built, and on the complexity of the transition in post-Communist 
Europe46.  
The founding years of the CEU coincided with the outbreak of wars in 
Yugoslavia. The CEU offered scholarships to Yugoslav students to allow them to 
study, and for many it was the only way of accessing university education. Over the 
years, the CEU has strongly defended the principle of academic freedom47. In 1995, 
all CEU activities were concentrated in Budapest.  
As Michael Ignatieff wrote, in the 1990s the transition in Eastern Europe was 
strongly regulated and encouraged by the process of joining the European Union. 
The incentives were all aimed at creating the initial structure of the open society, 
the separation of powers, free media, a free civil society, constitutional guarantees 
of rights and the protection of minorities. As long as the incentives of the accession 
process were operational, countries seeking to join the EU followed the path to an 
open society. In Central and Eastern Europe, all three objectives of the triple 
transition – democracy, the market economy and entry into the European Union – 
were achieved in 200448. 
The CEU’s activity in Budapest lasted until 2004 without the need to change its 
status as a foreign private university. However, in April of the same year, the 
Governor of the State of New York49 and the Hungarian government signed a joint 
declaration that confirmed the parties’ joint agreement to support the CEU’s goal 
of achieving Hungarian accreditation, while at the same time maintaining its status 
as an accredited American university. Following the 2004 joint declaration, a 
special law, namely Act LXI of 2004 on State Recognition of Közép-európai 
Egyetem, established Közép-európai Egyetem (KEE); literally translated, this 
means “Central European University”. The dual identity of CEU/KEE enabled the 
University to comply with both Hungarian and U.S. laws and award both Hungarian 
and U.S.-accredited degrees50. The aim was to achieve greater integration of the 
CEU in the Hungarian academic landscape, as well as to allow its integration into 





                                                 
46 C. Cerami, The Open Society and “British Soft Power” in Central/Eastern Europe at the End of 
Cold War, cit., 74. 
47 G. Soros, In Defense of Open Society, cit., 102.  
48 M. Ignatieff, Introduction, in M. Ignatieff, S. Roch (Eds.), Rethinking Open Society, cit., 9. 
49 CEU is organized as an American-style institution with a charter from the Board of Regents of 




51 S. Benvenuti, La libertà accademica e la sua tutela nello spazio europeo. Riflessioni sulla vicenda 
della Central European University alla luce della sentenza CGUE Commissione c. Ungheria del 6 
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3. The “CEU affair”, Hungary and the European Union 
 
The years following the end of the Cold War were strongly characterised by two 
crucial processes in the international scenario of the end of the 20th century: 
globalisation and the technological/digital revolution. Economic and social 
relations were characterised by new dynamics that created unexplored prospects for 
growth and innovation, but which, at the same time, led to the emergence of 
economic, cultural and social gaps. 
In Central and Eastern Europe, all three objectives of the triple transition 
(democracy, the market economy and entry into the European Union) were 
achieved at the beginning of the 21st century. However, they all entered a crisis over 
the course of the new century. Once the European accession process was completed, 
the EU gradually lost its ability to consolidate the institutions of the open society in 
the new member States. A regression of democracy in several countries has brought 
overtly anti-liberal political forces to power. The ongoing debate on the origins and 
meaning of this phenomenon is wide-ranging and multifaceted and goes beyond the 
aims of this essay. 
It is important here to remember that the moment of triumph of the open society, 
which characterised the end of the Cold War and the years immediately following, 
started to show signs of crisis during the late 20th century, and the 21st century has 
led to a push in this direction. Some events have been significant and emblematic 
stages on this path. The attack on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon in New York 
on 11 September 2001, which was an expression of a new international terrorism, 
set in motion processes that have weakened the liberal order of democracy and the 
rule of law and in the international scenario have posed a threat to peace. After 11 
September 2001, the global financial crisis that erupted in 2008 constituted a further 
obstacle to strengthening the idea of an open society. In Central-Eastern Europe, 
when the democratic transition began to stall in the 2008 economic crisis, the new 
insecurities created fertile ground for furthering the consolidation process of 
illiberal democracies52. The 2008 economic crisis undermined confidence in the 
economic sovereignty of states and their ability to fairly distribute the benefits of 
prosperity53. These intersecting pressures – terrorism, rising inequality and job 
insecurity – have undermined the open society ideal. As Jacques Rupnik wrote, the 
main features of the illiberal turn can be summed up as follows: departure from the 
rule of law as the foundation of liberal democracy in the name of sovereignty of the 
people. The rise of nationalism and the hardening of identity politics corresponds 
to the shifting axes of legitimation from liberal technocratic to populist democracy. 
And finally, culture wars, a conservative revolution or rather a cultural “counter-
                                                 
52 M. Ignatieff, Rethinking Open Society, michaelignatieff.ca/article/2018/rethinking-open-
society/.The term “illiberal democracy” was first used by F. Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal 
Democracy, in Foreign Affairs, No. 6, 1997.  
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revolution” in Europe. The “culture wars” are the third part of the antiliberal turn 
in Central Europe54. 
This is the historical-political context in which the clash between the CEU and 
the populist right-wing Hungarian government led by Viktor Orbán, took place. The 
values promoted by the CEU were, and still are, in antithesis to the right-wing 
populist design promoted by the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. Tensions 
between the CEU and the Hungarian right date back to Viktor Orbán’s first 
government in 1998-2002. In 2010, Viktor Orbán and his right-wing party, Fidesz, 
returned to power, winning almost 53 percent of the national vote. The party 
invoked traditional nationalism to legitimise the populist idea that checks and 
balance were unnecessary55. The Hungarian Prime Minister decided to radicalise 
his plan to transform Hungary from a liberal democracy into an “illiberal state”. 
Orbán began to carry out an all-out attack on the country’s independent civil 
society: from academia to the media, to NGOs, to cultural and educational 
institutions. The tactic has been and still is to de-legitimise NGOs, journalists, the 
media, independent cultural institutions and, more generally, all expressions of 
dissent. Behind these illiberal defamation campaigns, there is a deadly serious 
attack on democratic institutions and the idea of a free and pluralist society. Orbán’s 
historic speech on 26 July 2014, at Fidesz’ summer camp in Băile Tușnad, 
reaffirmed his commitment to build an illiberal state in Hungary56. Most 
importantly, he signalled which side his government had chosen in the new 
geopolitical and ideological struggle between Russia and the West. Orbán endorsed 
Putin’s model of populist leadership and an executive based on assertive 
nationalism57. 
Starting from 2015, it was the wave of migration that made the battle of the 
supporters of the open society ever more complex. As highlighted by Jan Zielonka 
in Counter-Revolution. Liberal Europe in retreat, migrants represent the essential 
product of a political world that has opened borders, protected minorities and 
shaped the economic interdependence of post 198958. Migrants have been at the 
centre of the political campaigns of the enemies of the open society. Orbán’s 
government has campaigned on an aggressive anti-immigration platform, building 
a fence along its southern border, putting a 25% tax on organisations which provide 
aid to refugees, and repeatedly claiming that “Christian Europe” is under threat 
from migration59. The migration crisis has also led to a dichotomy between two 
                                                 
54 J. Rupnik, Explaining Eastern Europe: The Crisis of Liberalism, in Journal of Democracy, No. 3, 
2018, 24-38. 
55J.W. Mueller, Eastern Europe Goes South, cit., 15-16. 
56 See the full text of Viktor Orbán’s speech at Băile Tuşnad (Tusnádfürdő) of July 26, 2014, 
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57 V. Harms, Open Society v. Illiberal State: Europe, Hungary and the “Lex CEU”, in Cultures of 
History Forum, 12 September 2007,.cultures-of-history.uni-jena.de/focus/lex-ceu/europe-hungary-
and-the-lex-ceu. 
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parts of Europe on the question of “European values”, with very different contents: 
on the one hand, humanitarian universalism, openness and multicultural society; on 
the other hand, the “European cultural identity”, the closing of borders and the 
defence of Christian-European civilization. As pointed out by Ivan Krastev and 
Stephen Holmes in The Light that Failed: A Reckoning, in Orbán's populist 
propaganda, Western Europe no longer represents the model of a culturally superior 
West that the citizens of Central Eastern Europe once admired and aspired to 
emulate. Unable to defend their borders against foreign “invaders”, the open 
societies of Western Europe now offer, according to Orbán, a substantially negative 
model, a living picture of the social, heterogeneous and multi-ethnic order that 
Europeans Central and Eastern Europe want to avoid60.  
There has been an increasing number of attacks on civil society, independent 
media and academic freedom in Hungary, threatening the future of democracy in 
the region. Viktor Orbán’s government has dismantled Hungary’s post-1989 
democratic order and subdued the country’s higher education system61. The attack 
on the CEU is part of a broader attempt to integrate academic institutions into Viktor 
Orbán’s conception of “illiberal democracy”62. Over the years, the CEU has 
strongly defended the principle of academic freedom, open society and rule of law. 
The result was a concerted attack by Orbán, who used all his powers to dismantle 
the entire higher education system in Hungary and oust the CEU. 
In 2017, the CEU came under attack by the Hungarian government substantially 
challenging its existence in Hungary through sudden and targeted legislative action. 
On 28 March 2017, the government tabled the amendment to the Higher Education 
Act known as “Lex CEU”. The draft law T/14686, amending some provisions of 
the Act CCIV of 2011 on Higher Education, was presented to the Hungarian 
Parliament. The main aim was to reform the licensing regime applicable to foreign 
higher education institutions63. The CEU expressed its opposition to proposed 
amendments to Act CCIV of 2011 on National Higher Education64. 
In an article in the New York Times on 2 April 2017, entitled Academic Freedom, 
under Threat in Europe, Michael Ignatieff wrote: 
 
Academic freedom is a cornerstone of democracy and a free society […]. The 
latest threat to academic freedom is occurring in the heart of Europe. In Hungary, 
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s government has introduced a bill in Parliament that 
would effectively abolish the freedom of the Central European University, a private 
American-Hungarian graduate institution […]. The bill would forbid the university 
form issuing its American degree, require it to open a campus in the United States 
(it operates only in Budapest) and put it under the control of the Hungarian 
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government […]. If the bill passes, it would mark the first time that a member of the 
European Union dared to legislate an attack on the academic freedom of a university. 
It would also mark the first time than an American ally, a member of NATO, openly 
attacked an American institution on its soil65. 
 
On 4 April 2017, the Hungarian Parliament accepted the modification of the Law 
on Higher Education66 and rushed a bill that made it impossible for CEU to continue 
operating in the country67. Lecturers and students from numerous universities, as 
well as many ordinary Hungarian citizens demonstrated several times to show their 
solidarity. On 9 April 2017, between 60,000 and 80,000 people protested on the 
streets of Budapest, calling on President János Áder to veto “Lex CEU”. 
International writers, artists and academics protested against Hungary’s plans to 
close the CEU and wrote an open letter: 
 
We are deeply concerned about the passing of the disgraceful law intended to 
shut the Central European University in Budapest. The law, intended for this one 
specific purpose, is the latest step taken by Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán 
to close out democratic institutions in the country, including press, media and NGOs. 
Please note we do not say opposition institutions since the CEU is in no way a 
political opponent of the government. It is simply an independent university68. 
 
On 10 April 2017, Hungarian President János Áder signed the amendments to 
Hungary’s National Higher Education Legislation. The so-called “Lex CEU” was 
ratified. The new law made it impossible for the CEU to maintain its dual legal 
status. Under the “Lex CEU”, CEU’s American entity should have opened a 
campus in the United States, which would then have had to negotiate a bilateral 
treaty with Hungary in order to operate in the latter69. The words of the Rector of 
CEU at that time, Michael Ignatieff, were very harsh: «This is a dark day for 
freedom in Hungary, and it’s a dark day for academic freedom in Europe». Political 
scientist Cas Mudde reiterated that with the new law Hungary joined a growing 
group of authoritarian countries that (to all intents and purposes) have closed 
independent universities, including Belarus, Russia and Turkey70.  
The European Union decided to intervene. On 26 April 2017, the European 
Commission announced infringement proceedings against Hungary, claiming that 
the “Lex CEU” was incompatible both with «the commitments Hungary had 
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undertaken within the framework of the GATS and with the freedom of 
establishment, the free movement of services and the provisions of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights relating to academic freedom, the freedom to found higher 
education institutions and the freedom to conduct a business»71. 
On 7 December 2017, the European Commission referred Hungary to the 
European Court of Justice of the EU over the Higher Education Law, which could 
force the closure of the Central European University (CEU)72. Meanwhile, in 
December 2018, the CEU was forced to leave Budapest and announced that its new 
campus was to open in Vienna the following academic year. 
Finally, on 6 October 2020, the European Union’s highest court ruled that «the 
conditions introduced by Hungary to enable foreign higher education institutions to 
carry out their activities in its territory are incompatible with EU law»73. More 
specifically, «in its judgment in Commission v Hungary (Higher education) 
(C‑66/18), delivered on 6 October 2020, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice 
upheld the action for failure to fulfil obligations brought against Hungary by the 
European Commission. The Court held, first, that, by making the exercise, in 
Hungary, of teaching activities leading to a qualification by higher education 
institutions situated outside the European Economic Area (EEA) subject to the 
existence of an international treaty between Hungary and the third country in which 
the institution concerned has its seat, Hungary has failed to comply with the 
commitments in relation to national treatment given under the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS), concluded within the framework of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). That requirement is also contrary to the provisions of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (“the Charter”) relating to 
academic freedom, the freedom to found higher education institutions and the 
freedom to conduct a business. Second, the Court held that, by making the exercise, 
in Hungary, of the activities of foreign higher education institutions, including 
institutions having their seat in another Member State of the EEA, subject to the 
condition that they offer higher education in the country in which they have their 
seat, Hungary has failed to comply with its national treatment commitments under 
the GATS and with its obligations in respect of the freedom of establishment, the 
free movement of services, and the abovementioned provisions of the Charter»74. 
The CEU affair highlights three main considerations: firstly, the importance of 
strengthening the legal protection of academic freedom across Europe; secondly, 
the dangerous attack on the idea of an open society, academic freedom and rule of 




73 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 6 October 2020, C-66/18 – European Commission v 
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law in 21st century Europe; lastly, the crucial role of European institutions, civil 




The CEU affair has brought about a broad and needful debate about the nature 
of academic freedom and the necessity of standing up in its defence – in Hungary, 
in Europe and elsewhere. The CEU has launched several major academic initiatives 
to study the issue in its broadest terms75. The response of the CEU was a renewed 
reflection on the concept of open society. The central question was: Why are the 
key values of the open society – freedom, justice, tolerance, democracy and respect 
for knowledge – under attack in Europe today, and more generally across the world? 
During 2017 and 2018, the university invited scholars from all over the world to 
join a series of conferences and debates on the subject. The first result of this work 
has been published in a collective volume entitled Rethinking Open Society. New 
Adversaries and New Opportunities, which has already been mentioned in this 
essay76. The debate on this issue is extremely stimulating and topical and requires 
further investigation. I would like to recall some points that make the CEU affair 
emblematic of the relationship between academic freedom, open society and rule 
of law. 
An open society is intrinsically complex and demanding: rather than offering 
easy, immediate simplifications, it requires complexity. Its ideals may seem 
demanding as it requires us to respect the dignity of others, to exercise the fullness 
of a sense of citizenship, and to make choices based on the search for doubt rather 
than on the obscurantism of dogma. As Dahrendorf wrote: «The open society does 
not promise an easy life. Indeed, human beings have a dangerous penchant for the 
coziness of a closed world. But if we want to move forward and improve ourselves 
and the conditions in which men and women live on this planet, we have got to 
accept the untidy, antagonistic, uncomfortable, but proud and encouraging prospect 
of open horizons»77. The political scientist Jan Zielonka, starting from Dahrendorf’s 
reflections, recalls that today, the attack by the enemies of open society targets 
liberal democratic constitutionalism, the liberal notion of open borders, but also 
feminism, multiculturalism, abortion, gay rights, environmentalism, cultural 
tolerance and religious neutrality78. It is therefore necessary to make a renewed 
reflection on the concept of open society, taking into account the plurality, 
heterogeneity and hybridisation of a Europe shaped by globalisation, which can also 
embrace human progress, social equity and sustainable development79. 
This is a watershed moment, for Europe and for the world. The defence of the 
open society ideal in Europe is a battle of civilization; it concerns the very essence 
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of European values, which must involve European institutions and leaders, civil 
society and intellectuals.  
In this difficult historical moment, we need political leaders who can defend the 
values of the open society and face the challenges of modernity: innovation and 
evolution, knowledge and competence, but also solidarity and inclusion. The 
European Union and its rulers cannot afford uncertainties, ambiguities or 
comfortable silences in the face of dangerous and anachronistic attacks on these 
values. In this scenario, the European institutions play a decisive role in respecting 
and defending the founding values of the European project, without neglecting the 
presence of an informed and independent European civil society80.  
Civil society is a product of the natural progression of civilization, so it has a 
fundamental role in the relaunch of the open society ideal. Open society is a society 
endowed with a healthy and robust civil society, capable of expressing itself 
through the “creative chaos” of associations, religious institutions, artistic forms 
and educational institutions81.  
Finally, another crucial point is the role of intellectuals and the need to support 
a new narrative in promoting the values of the open society. If it is true that in 
ordinary times intellectuals are just useful, but in troubled times they are necessary, 
intellectuals today have a fundamental role in relaunching the values of open 
society such as modernity, inclusiveness, change and plurality.  
The CEU affair also expressed the importance of building a strong and vibrant 
academic community, capable of involving civil society.  
The real challenge today in Europe is not only the complexity of the dilemmas 
associated with “squaring the circle” of wealth creation, social cohesion and 
political freedom82, but also the increasingly widespread perception of 
“irrelevance”83. Over the last decade, many people have remained on the fringes of 
society, and this is a story of anomie, disintegration and fear. The enhancement of 
local communities84, the participation in public and social spaces, the perception of 
being an active part in the construction of a political, cultural, economic, 
educational or social project, are fundamental aspects in relaunching the ideal of an 
open society in 21st century Europe. The CEU affair expresses the strength of an 
active academic community that has fought and continues to fight for the defence 
of academic freedom, open society and rule of law. 
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